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2.3 
______ 
Global Problems in Domestic Courts 
Ralf Michaels* 
We face an increasing number of problems that are essentially global in 
nature because they affect the world in its entirety: global cartels, climate 
change, crimes against humanity; to name a few. These problems require 
world courts, yet world courts in the institutional sense are largely 
lacking. Hence, domestic courts must function, effectively, as world 
courts. Given the unlikelihood of effective world courts in the future, our 
challenge is to establish under what conditions domestic courts can play 
this role of world courts effectively and legitimately. 
1. Introduction 
Lawyers are bad at predicting the future; they have enough work on their 
hands with the present. Despite frequent claims that law is proactive – it 
guides conduct – its substance is almost always reactive, a reaction to 
recognised social problems. The law lags. Moreover, the acceleration of 
all aspects of life (one of the key characteristics of globalisation) has led 
to a situation in which deliberative responses by lawmakers almost always 
come, if not too late, then at least with a considerable delay. This has long 
been true for legislators and courts (and has led to the turn to the 
executive in lawmaking). Moreover, it is true, increasingly, for executive 
action, too. 
This inability of lawyers (and of the law) to predict the future is 
well-known, but it is neither trivial nor easy to overcome. It has a twofold 
implication for attempts to answer the question as to the biggest 
challenges for the law in the near future. First, although substantive 
problems are always new and often unpredictable, structural problems are 
relatively constant. We may not know what substantive questions the law 
will have to resolve in the future, but we can guess what structure many of 
these problems will have. In short, they will be global problems that 
transcend national boundaries (though in a particular way that I will 
discuss later). Second, to prepare the law for the future, we should first 
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make sure it matches the requirements of the present. We do not know for 
sure what globalisation will bring in the future, but we do know that the 
law is structurally ill-equipped even for its present. Presuming that 
globalisation will continue, a law more adequately prepared for 
globalisation would be desirable in the future.  
The biggest structural challenge for current law is well-known (and 
actually expressed in the background note) but not well understood: more 
and more problems are global, while our institutions are not. Although we 
have been aware of this challenge for considerable time, our responses 
have so far been insufficient. Supranational institutions, as one solution, 
will not be able to deal with all of these problems to a sufficient degree. 
Global legal unification will also remain incomplete. Networks are a 
fascinating, but at the same time slightly elusive, new concept. As a 
consequence, what we will be left with, for a large portion of global 
problems, is fragmentation, ensuring the need for domestic institutions, 
especially courts, to deal with these global problems. Where necessary, 
they have to do so in a unilateral fashion. 
Fragmentation may be considered undesirable (though this is not 
certain), but to the extent we cannot overcome it we need to make the best 
of it. What we need are three things. First, we need a better understanding 
of what global problems actually are, how they differ from other problems 
that may or may not also be related to globalisation, and how they 
challenge current concepts of law. Second, we need a better 
understanding of the role that domestic institutions, in particular courts, 
can play in response to such problems, and thereby for the global legal 
system at large. Third, we need better criteria, both legal and political, for 
when and how domestic courts can perform these roles. In this brief 
position paper (based on a book I am currently working on) I will address 
these three aspects. 
2. Global Problems 
Globalisation creates a lot of new problems for the law, but many of those 
do not require paradigmatically new thinking because they fit in the 
traditional disciplines of either domestic law or international law. 
Many problems are domestic in nature, which means that domestic 
law and institutions can deal with them in the same way as before. 
Recently, they have been helped more and more by comparative law – 
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they have realised that other countries face similar problems, and 
therefore may provide valuable inspiration – but this alone does not create 
any paradigmatic changes. 
Other problems are international in nature: they concern various 
countries and/or their relations among each other. Much trade law is in 
this category. More perhaps than domestic problems, such international 
problems create new challenges to the law, because international law, the 
typical response to such problems, today covers a far broader array of 
issues than it did before. Again, however, what this requires is an 
extension of existing paradigms, not a paradigmatic change.  
A paradigmatic change will be required, by contrast, for what I call 
global problems. Global problems are characterised by two qualities. 
First, they concern the world at large, not just one country or one region, 
or the relations between only a few countries (this does not mean that they 
necessarily affect everyone similarly.) Second, they cannot be separated 
into different sub-problems that can be solved individually. Rather, an 
adequate response has an effect on the whole problem. 
We can distinguish different kinds of global problems, according to 
what makes them global (although the boundaries between these 
categories are not sharp, distinguishing them helps the analysis). Some 
problems are global by nature. Climate change may be a prime example. 
It is a problem that is global by nature not because the problem has been 
created by nature (in all likelihood it has not) but instead because the 
nature of our climate makes it so that solutions can never be only local. 
Other problems are global by design. Liability for internet defamation is a 
prime example here: the internet has been designed so as to be globally 
accessible, with the result that, without special software, content becomes 
accessible from anywhere. Here the global character of the problem is a 
consequence of the design of the internet – a redesign of the internet or its 
infrastructure, including software, can change the problem‘s character. 
Some problems, finally, are global by definition. Crimes against 
humanity, for example, are global because we decide to conceptualise 
them as such, as directed not against the individual victims (who may well 
be defined by territory or nationality) but instead against a global category 
par excellence, namely humanity at large.  
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3. A Global Problem by Nature: Global Markets 
One type of global problems by nature concerns global markets. A good 
example from the law of antitrust is the Empagran decision of the US 
Supreme Court, rendered in 2004. Several producers of certain vitamin 
products, most of them European, had fixed prices worldwide and made 
billions of dollars in profits. The US plaintiffs sued in the US and 
received considerable payments under a settlement. The interesting case 
was brought not by US consumers but by consumers from countries like 
Ecuador and the Ukraine, who had also suffered injuries from inflated 
prices, and who sued the cartel members in a US court in a worldwide 
class action. Foreign plaintiffs, foreign defendants, and foreign markets – 
should US courts have jurisdiction? 
Worldwide price fixing is a global problem by nature, because, 
given the current conditions of global markets, it cannot be territorially 
confined or split up. Where we have truly worldwide markets, participants 
in cartels must necessarily fix prices worldwide because if they fix them 
only for specific national markets, the consumers in those markets will 
purchase their products elsewhere, and this arbitrage will make the cartel 
ineffective. In this sense, the cartel participants in the Empagran case did 
not, nor in fact could they fix prices individually for individual markets; 
they raised prices globally because the global character of the market in 
vitamin products forced them to do so. 
Much of the debate concerned the question whether the US had any 
interest, thus asking essentially whether the global cartel was a domestic 
problem or not. The defendants pointed out that the U.S. had no interest in 
regulating foreign markets. The plaintiffs on the other hand argued that 
US consumers would benefit from these claims by foreign plaintiffs, 
because these claims would enhance the deterrent effect on the cartel, 
which would otherwise remain undeterred. Defendants focused on the 
specific plaintiffs with their injuries; plaintiffs focused on the whole event 
of the cartel and its effects on the US economy. Both agreed, however, 
that the connection to the US was crucial, and both ignored the rest of the 
world. This was inadequate. After all, some countries such as Canada and 
Japan, as well as the European Commission – had levied high fines on the 
cartel. With regard to these countries, there was obviously additional 
deterrence for cartels. Other countries, by contrast, had not. 
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Along these lines, Europeans invoked international law and 
relations and submitted amicus curiae briefs in the litigation, arguing in 
essence that jurisdiction of US courts would interfere with their sovereign 
interests – even though all countries agree that, in substance, price fixing 
is illegal. They argued that each country should deal with the effects on its 
own local markets and that private suits to enforce antitrust laws were 
against European culture. The Supreme Court essentially followed these 
complaints (although with a twist to be mentioned later) and rejected the 
claim. The problem with this argument is that it presumes that the cartel 
can be divided into territorial subparts, and this seems doubtful. 
Europeans point out that the task of US antitrust law is to protect US 
consumers, not to regulate foreign markets. But what if the protection of 
US consumers requires the regulation of foreign markets? Worse, what if 
there is no difference between foreign and local markets at all, because we 
have only one global market in vitamins? Moreover, the European 
countries that submitted amicus curiae briefs argued successfully against 
US hegemonialism. However the result of their intervention was that 
plaintiffs from Ecuador and Ukraine were unable to recover their damages 
anywhere. One could well describe this as a different kind of 
hegemonialism, this time over developing countries that do not have the 
infrastructure to prosecute global cartels and that rely on the first world to 
do this for them.  
In the end, both approaches appear inadequate, because they do not 
capture the global character of the problem. The domestic approach must 
fail because it ignores the degree to which the cartel has effects outside 
the United States. The international approach must fail because it requires 
separability of the cartel: the United States can leave the regulation of the 
European part of the cartel to Europeans, only if such a separate part 
exists; this however, is doubtful. 
4. A Global Problem by Design: The Review of UN Security Council 
Resolutions 
An example of global problems by design is the review of resolutions by 
the UN Security Council. Such problems are global by design because 
their global nature follows from the design of the Security Council as a 
global institution. Such resolutions create international law, so the 
Security Council can be understood as a kind of global legislator. 
However, judicial review of its decisions is not provided under 
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international law. Early ideas to give review competence to the 
International Court of Justice (the most obvious candidate) were rejected 
by some of the permanent members of the Security Council. 
The consequence is that such a review can only be provided, if at 
all, by domestic courts. This became urgent especially with resolutions 
that froze assets of individuals assembled on a list of presumed financiers 
of international terrorism. Because these resolutions did not provide these 
individuals with recourse, some of them appealed instead to domestic 
courts in various countries, and to the Court of First Instance in the 
European Union (Kadi). The Kadi case is an example for both the 
potential and the conceptual limits of domestic courts when faced with 
this problem (for purposes of this analysis, the Court of First Instance and 
the European Court of Justice as an appellate court can be understood as 
quasi-domestic courts). The Court of First Instance effectively denied that 
domestic courts were competent to review resolutions of the Security 
Council, except implicitly. The European Court of Justice, by contrast, 
presumed that it was possible to review such resolutions insofar as they 
had been transposed into domestic law, thereby ignoring their 
supranational character. Both approaches map well on a distinction 
between the international law and a domestic law paradigm, but both 
seem similarly incapable of grasping the specifically global character of 
these resolutions. The opinion of the Advocate General came closest to a 
global approach when he spoke of a situation of legal pluralism between 
domestic, European and international law. What is lacking from his 
analysis as well as from most commentary on the decisions is a proper 
conceptualisation of the global legal system in which domestic courts act 
effectively as review courts. 
5. A Global Problem by Definition: Human Rights Violations 
An example of global problems by definition is human rights litigation. If 
a Nigerian woman living in Nigeria with her Nigerian husband is stoned 
to death because of alleged adultery with another Nigerian, this seems to 
be an affair entirely internal to Nigeria. Indeed, ‗internal affair‘ is the 
exact codeword governments traditionally use to oppose any intervention 
by foreign journalists, politicians and courts. But of course we reject such 
claims in the human rights realm, and we do so with an argumentative 
trick. We change the victim‘s status from (local) citizen to (global) 
human. We turn the perpetrator from an enemy of the victim to an enemy 
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of the world, a hostis humani generis. We raise crimes from the localised 
crime of murder to the globalised crime against humanity. Murder would 
have to be prosecuted according to the territorial laws. A crime against 
humanity on the other hand is by definition deterritorialised, simply 
because humanity transcends all territoriality, except (perhaps) that of the 
globe. The colère global, to paraphrase Durkheim, the global outrage over 
a crime, turns a territorial event into a world event. 
One of the oldest federal statutes, the so-called Alien Tort Statute, 
gives federal courts jurisdiction for ―a tort only in violation of 
international law‖. This statute lay dormant for nearly 200 years until it 
was revived in 1980, and turned into a main jurisdictional basis for human 
rights violations. The statute gives something akin to universal 
jurisdiction, which means that human rights violations from all across the 
globe can be carried before US courts and are in fact carried there. 
Universal criminal jurisdiction over human rights violations is currently 
much discussed, and often favourably – although the International 
Criminal Court is often preferred as a venue, domestic courts are 
considered to play a role, too. The American Alien Tort Statute is special, 
however. First, it applies to private plaintiffs, so plaintiff lawyers rather 
than state attorneys decide about prosecution. Second, it has been applied 
not only against government officials (who are frequently immune from 
lawsuits), but also against corporations that collaborate with governments. 
Thereby, many multinational companies have been turned into potential 
defendants against such claims. 
Not surprisingly, this basis of jurisdiction is now under severe 
criticism both in the U.S. and elsewhere. Human rights violations taking 
place elsewhere are not domestic US problems and they do not create 
significant US interests (beyond such secondary interests like the interest 
in being a good citizen of the world). It would seem easier to find 
international law solutions, but only prima facie. First, the country that is 
primarily interested, is often the country whose government committed or 
at least took part in the human rights violation. Second, and perhaps even 
more importantly, international law solutions tend to leave decisions over 
whether human rights violations are adjudicated to governments, and 
governments, for reasons of international relations, will often be unwilling 
to inquire. 
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6. The Role of Domestic Courts  
Local events can be dealt with by domestic courts in accordance with 
domestic law; international events as events between nations can be dealt 
with by international courts, established by and under international laws. 
Global problems, however, cannot be dealt with adequately by domestic 
or international law, at least in the ways in which we traditionally 
understand them.  
One response to global problems has been the creation of truly 
global courts, the International Criminal Court being a prime example. 
Even if we assume such institutions to be normatively desirable (and 
doubts exist on this, particularly in the United States), it seems clear now 
that, at least in the short run, we will not have a sufficient number of such 
institutions. International criminal law is a good example: the vast 
majority of cases under the jurisdiction of the ICC are dealt with (if at all) 
by domestic courts.  
A second response has been closer cooperation – sometimes called 
networks – between courts. Such networks can, to some extent, substitute 
for true global courts by bringing everyone in. At the same time, networks 
face high coordination problems once the number of involved courts 
becomes great – as will often be the case with global problems. Moreover, 
networks fail where different countries differ either in their substantive 
perspectives or, perhaps even more often, in their desire to be active (a 
free-rider problem). 
This suggests that much of globalisation will continue to be 
handled, quasi-unilaterally, by domestic institutions, in particular 
domestic courts. I say continue, because domestic courts already deal with 
such problems. Frequently, however, they feel the need to deny the global 
character of these problems. The Supreme Court decision in the 
Empagran case shows this clearly. In holding for the defendants, the court 
assumed explicitly that the cartel‘s effects on the US were separate from 
the effects on foreign markets, but we know of course that these effects 
are not independent from each other. The court rested its decision on facts 
that are demonstrably wrong, but the court had to do so in order to 
conceptualise the problem of global cartels. Only the fictitious 
compartmentalisation of global markets made it possible to reconcile 
global cartels with traditional approaches to jurisdiction. Obviously this 
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does not make the problem go away, and indeed the problem may well 
reach the Supreme Court again. 
The reason for such redefinition of the global character is our 
uneasiness with unilateral extraterritorial adjudication. We have long 
rejected unilateral action by domestic courts as illegitimate, and we still 
feel it to be inferior to international agreement or adjudication by 
supranational courts. As a consequence, the main concern in unilateral 
adjudication has been devoted, usually, to constraining it. Given that such 
unilateral adjudication will, in the foreseeable future, remain the 
predominant legal response to globalisation, this is unsatisfactory. We 
will need a better theory of when and how such adjudication is possible. 
If global problems require global courts, how can domestic courts 
play a role? Semantically, we must distinguish two very different aspects 
of ‗global‘ that are often confounded. One is the institutional, or 
constitutional, aspect. In this sense a global court is a court that has been 
set up by the world, a court of the world. Of course the world in its 
entirety is unable to set up the court, which is why we have recourse to 
international treaties or the United Nations as a kind of second best. I call 
these courts international courts, because they are founded on 
international law. But there is another aspect of ‗global‘ in world courts, 
and it concerns the scope of application, the ‗reach‘ if you will, the 
jurisdiction. Here, a world court is a court for the world. This aspect is 
analytically different from the first one, though of course both may 
coincide. Thus the International Court of Justice is a world court also in 
this second sense; its jurisdiction is worldwide. However, the reach of 
domestic courts on the other hand can be global, too. If it is, these courts 
act as world courts. 
7. Challenges 
How can domestic courts adequately respond to these challenges? Short 
of actual solutions, this paper can list the areas in which we will require 
rethinking. 
One area concerns the discipline that will have to bear much of the 
burden from these problems: conflict of laws. Conflict of laws, as 
traditionally understood, deals with relations between different legal 
systems and the localisation of problems in one of these systems. It 
determines the competent courts and the applicable law on the basis of 
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connecting factors that connect a set of facts more closely to one country 
and its laws. For global problems, however, we are frequently faced with 
either universal or ubiquitous jurisdiction. Universal jurisdiction is 
jurisdiction that, in principle, every country‘s courts can exercise. 
Ubiquitous jurisdiction can be defined as jurisdiction that is based on 
factors that connect a problem to every country, for example accessibility 
of a website. Neither universal nor ubiquitous jurisdiction fit well in the 
traditional criteria, and we may have to develop new approaches. One 
example can be found in Article 6(3)(b) of the Rome II Regulation, which 
allows a court, under certain conditions, to apply its own law on unfair 
competition even to the claims of plaintiffs who purchased on other 
markets. Although the provision is far from perfect, some of the criticism 
it has received seems unjustified: if the provision does not fit well with 
traditional private international law, this may be a sign less of the 
provision‘s inadequacy and instead of the discipline‘s inadequacy. 
Notably, extraterritoriality is not a helpful criterion to assess such 
adjudication. If global problems could be separated into territorial 
components, each court could adjudicate a neatly defined territorial space, 
and the problem of extraterritoriality should not occur. Global problems, 
by contrast cannot be so separated. Global cartels are global because they 
transcend boundaries and territories – price changes in one country 
necessitate price changes in other countries. Human rights violations are 
global precisely because we define them as such; we emphasise the 
deterritorialised interests of humanity at-large over the territorially 
confined interests of the specific victims or their perpetrators. In short, 
because world events are deterritorialised, they do not involve the 
territorial interests which would trigger complaints that territorial 
sovereignty is infringed. Without territoriality there is no 
extraterritoriality.  
Another area concerns institutional requirements. Traditionally, 
domestic courts are expected to deal with domestic problems, either under 
their own law or under foreign law –  they lack a global perspective. We 
have made progress towards such a perspective. For example, the 
increased use of comparative law shows an increasingly global awareness 
on the part of judges. However, more will be needed. We will need 
doctrines that detach the judicial task from the furthering of domestic 
political interests. We will need courts with an understanding of the 
implications their decisions have for governance – not just domestic or 
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international, but global governance. What helps courts in this regard is 
their relative independence. After all, the legitimacy of courts lies not in 
their direct accountability to the electorate but in the quality of their 
decisions, if necessary, against political pressure. 
This last point leads to a third challenge. Accountability to the 
electorate prevents the other branches of government – the executive and 
especially the legislature – from truly globalizing; in the end they are 
expected to protect the interests of their voters over those of others. This 
suggests that democratically made law on the national level can lack 
legitimacy on the global sphere. The traditional response to such lack of 
legitimacy is for courts to limit application of domestic law to areas for 
which the domestic lawmaker has both jurisdiction and an actual 
regulatory interest. This process is inadequate – it either leads to the 
application of a law that is, at least potentially, equally parochial, or to the 
dismissal of a claim for lack of regulatory interest of any concerned 
government. The alternative for courts will be to develop transnational 
law on their own, even in deviation from domestic rules of substantive 
law and of private international law. 
